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By ARTHUR W. WRIGHT
Medicare has been much in the news, 
amid the swirling public-policy debate 
over  President  Obama’s  push  for 
“health  care  reform”.    It  is  Exhibit 
#1 as a public health insurance pro-
gram,  which  many  Democrats  insist 
is essential to true reform.  President 
Obama’s chief budget officer, econo-
mist  Peter  Orszag,  has  long  viewed 
differences  across  states  in  health 
care  reimbursements  per  Medicare 
enrollee  as  opportunities  for  bud-
get  savings  without  cutting  quality.   
This article explores possible empiri-
cal reasons why interstate Medicare 
spending per enrollee varies so much, 
to see whether federal dollars could 




program	 that	 provides	 health	 insur-
ance	to	all	seniors	65	and	older,	plus	
certain	 younger	 people,	 who	 qualify	
to	enroll.		Most	private	health	insur-




tax	 on	 all	 money	 earnings	 (1.45%	
each	 for	 employers	 and	 employees).	 	







$96.40	 per	 month,	 deducted	 from	













tors.	 	 Two	 examples:	 state	 insurance	
regulation	affects	the	scope	and	price	of	
the	 optional	 supplemental	 coverages,	
and	state	laws	(from	statutes	to	court	













	 In	 2007,	 the	 federal	 agency	 that	
administers	Medicare,	the	Centers	for	
Medicare	 and	 Medicaid	 Services	 or	
CMS,	released	comprehensive	data	on	
Medicare	reimbursements	per	enrollee	
(hereafter,	 “spending	 rates”),	 by	 state	
of	residence,	covering	the	period	1991-
2004.		Those	data	(search	CMS	on	the	
Internet)	 were	 compiled	 as	 part	 of	 a	
much	broader	effort	to	amass	national	
and	 state	 data	 on	 health-care	 spend-
ing.
	 Between	 1991	 and	 2004,	 the	






In principle, Medicare 
reimburses providers 
at uniform rates across 
the nation; in practice, 
amounts paid vary 
considerably.FALL 2009  THE CONNECTICUT ECONOMY  11 
line	graph).		The	real	increase—adjust-
ed	 for	 the	 change	 in	 the	 purchasing	
power	 of	 the	 dollar	 as	 measured	 by	
the	CPI-U,	which	averaged	just	under	
2.6%	 annually	 over	 the	 period—was	
about	3.5%	per	year.		Viewed	differ-




U	 for	 1991-2004.	 	 So,	 on	 average,	










a	 different,	 and	 more	 costly,	 mix	 of	
medical	care	that	geezers	(of	whom	I	
am	 one)	 receive,	 compared	 with	 the	
treatments	needed	by	the	younger	set.	 	
For	 example,	 the	 elderly	 may	 make	
more	 frequent	 use	 of	 hospitals,	 with	
longer	 stays.	 	 And	 we’ve	 all	 read—
and	(in	the	August	2009	“town	hall”	
shouting	matches)	heard—about	how	




	 So	 Orszag	 may	 have	 to	 look	 to	
interstate	 differences	 in	 Medicare	
spending	 rates	 to	 find	 real	 savings.	 	












scrambling	 the	 1991	 rank-ordering.	 	
By	 2004,	 pride-of-place	 at	 the	 top	
belonged	to	Louisiana,	at	$8,659,	just	
ahead	 of	 Maryland	 ($8,535),	 New	
Jersey	($8,512),	and	Florida	($8,462).	 	
Connecticut	ranked	7th,	at	$8,185.		
	 Looking	 at	 average	 rates	 of	
increase,	 1991-2004,	 Nebraska	 and	
South	Carolina	tied	for	tops	at	7.6%	
a	year,	while	Pennsylvania—highest	in	
spending	 per	 enrollee	 in	 1991—saw	





VARIATIONS IN MEDICARE 
SPENDING RATES
	 The	starting	point	of	my	empiri-
cal	 analysis	 was	 1991-2004	 data	 on	
real	 state-by-state	 Medicare	 spending	




“panel”	 regression	 model	 combined	
















care	 per	 non-Medicare-enrolled	 per-
son	(state	population	minus	Medicare	
enrollees),	 deflated	 as	 the	 dependent	
variable	was.
	 I	 expected	 the	 independent	 vari-
ables	 for	 doctors	 and	 hospital	 beds	
to	 affect	 a	 state’s	 Medicare	 spending	
rate	 positively:	 The	 more	 physicians	
and	hospital	beds	available,	the	greater	
the	 propensity	 to	 order	 tests,	 recom-
mend	 hospital-based	 procedures,	 and	
the	like.		In	other	words,	competition	
among	 doctors	 and	 hospitals	 would	
lead	not	to	price	effects	but	in	other	
directions,	such	as	more	thorough	or	
careful	 services.	 	 Similarly,	 I	 expect-
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(continued from page 11)
	 Besides	the	four	independent	vari-
ables	just	discussed,	I	also	controlled	for	
so-called	 “fixed	 effects”,	 both	 among	
states	(“cross-state”)	and	among	years	
(“time-period”).	 	 In	 essence,	 adding	
fixed-effects	variables	checks	for	“hid-
den”	forces	not	captured	in	the	inde-




	 My	 results	 from	 estimating	 the	
above	 model	 (see	 table)	 were	 mixed	
in	terms	of	the	hypothesized	relation-
ships	 for	 the	 four	 independent	 vari-
ables.		To	get	positive	and	significant	
coefficients	on	three	of	the	four—all	
except	 the	 non-Medicare	 spending	
rate—it	was	necessary	to	ignore	fixed	
effects	altogether;	however,	that	speci-
fication	 explained	 only	 5%	 of	 the	
variation	 in	 the	 dependent	 variable.	 	
The	results	shown,	which	incorporate	












	 Controlling	 only	 for	 cross-state	
effects,	 the	 coefficient	 on	 the	 num-
ber	 of	 doctors	 per	 capita	 is	 highly	
significant	and	positive,	as	predicted:	
more	doctors	per	person	are	associated	





Medicare	 reimbursements	 are	 richer.	 	
But	 wait:	 if	 I	 also	 control	 for	 time-
period	 effects,	 the	 magnitude	 of	 this	
relationship	 becomes	 much	 smaller,	
and	 there	 is	 a	 relatively	 high	 16%	
probability	 that	 the	 coefficient	 could	
be	zero	or	negative.		Choosing	between	
the	two	different	specifications	of	the	




















the	 time-period	 effects	 included,	 but	
controlling	 for	 time	 makes	 the	 coef-
ficient	much	smaller,	and	the	p-value,	
at	0.187,	iffy.
	 Also	 in	 both	 specifications,	 non-
Medicare	 health-care	 spending	 per	
capita	moves	opposite	to	its	Medicare	
counterpart,	 contrary	 to	 predic-
tion.	 	 This	 suggests	 a	 substitution	
effect	 of	 some	 kind:	 spending	 more	





once	 people	 grow	 older).	 	 The	 sig-







on	 a	 very	 significant	 coefficient	 for	
the	real	per	capita	income	variable	in	
the	 left-hand	 regression	 does	 a	 flip-
flop	 when	 I	 control	 for	 time-period	






















both	 the	 doctors	 and	 hospital-beds	
variables,	to	take	advantage	of	the	full	
1991-2004	 range	 of	 the	 CMS	 data.	 	
And	it	may	be	possible	to	find	time-
series	data	by	state	for	added	indepen-








preliminary	 results	 indicate	 that	 his	











SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy.
A p-value is the chance of finding such an extreme value for the 
coefficient, if in fact no relationship actually exiists between the 
dependent and independent variable.  The smaller the p-value, the 
more statistically significant the result. 
Coefficient  p-value
Intercept  2558.3260 0.000
Doctors  0.5998 0.162
Hosp. Beds  -30.7848 0.187
Non-Medicare 
Spending Rate  -0.0565 0.000
Real PCI -0.0154 0.001







Adj. R2 = 0.9528
With cross-state and
  time-period effects  
With cross-state 
effects only  